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Ten years have passed since John Donohue and Steven Levitt initially proposed that legalized abortion
played a major role in the dramatic decline in crime during the 1990s. Criminologists largely dismiss
the association because simple plots of age-specific crime rates are inconsistent with a large cohort
affect following the legalization of abortion. Economists, on the other hand, have corrected mistakes
in the original analyses, added new data, offered alternative tests and tried to replicate the association
in other countries. Donohue and Levitt have responded to each challenge with more data and additional
regressions. Making sense of the dueling econometrics has proven difficult for even the most seasoned
empiricists. In this paper I review the evidence. I argue that the most straightforward test given available
data involves age-specific arrest and homicide rates regressed on lagged abortion rates in the 1970s
or indicators of abortion legalization in 1970 and 1973. Such models provide little support for the Donohue
and Levitt hypothesis in either the US or the United Kingdom.
Theodore J. Joyce
Baruch College
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“Unwantedness leads to high crime; abortion leads to less unwantedness; abortion leads 
to less crime.” Steven Levitt
1 
 
  “The academic debate will surely rage on for years, as studies and counterstudies are 
issued and enterprising young professors tie their hopes for tenure to either proving or 
disproving such a link.”  John W. Whitehead The Washington Times, June 28, 2001 
 
Ten years have passed since the Chicago Tribune published its front-page story on the 
relationship between legalized abortion and crime.
2   In a then unpublished manuscript Steven 
Levitt and John Donohue III contended that the legalization of abortion in the 1970s could 
explain as much as 50 percent of the dramatic decline in crime in the 1990s.  Almost two years 
later the manuscript was the lead article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.  A flurry of press 
reports followed, but it was not until the publication of Steven Levitt’s and Steven Dubner’s 
phenomenally successful book, Freakonomics, that the association between legalized abortion 
and crime became well-known among non-academics.
3  
The widespread familiarity of the abortion and crime hypothesis derives from several 
factors.  First, the hypothesis is exceedingly controversial.  Individually, abortion and crime 
generate impassioned responses, but linking them proved incendiary, which heightened interest 
in the media.  Second, the conceptual hypothesis is readily accessible and easily expressed 
without equations or jargon.  The notion that fewer unwanted children result in fewer 
psychologically injured and crime-prone adults strikes many as common sense.  Third, the 
evidence, as presented, is similarly transparent.   Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973.  The number 
                                                 
1 Stephen J. Dubner, “The Probability that a Real-Estate Agent is Cheating You (and Other Riddles of Modern 
Life)” New York Times Magazine, August 3, 2003. 
 
2 Karen Brandon, “Abortion, Reduced Crime Linked.” The Chicago Tribune August 8, 1999, p. 1. 
 
3 Levitt, Steven and Steven Dubner. 2005. Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the  
Hidden Side of Everything. New York: HarperCollins.  
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of legal abortions grew so rapidly that by 1980 there were over 1.5 million abortions as 
compared to 3.6 million births.  Since abortion is more prevalent among poor, unmarried and 
teen mothers, its legalization decreased large numbers of births to families at greater risk of 
raising potential criminals. The result is a major decline in crime 15 to 25 years after Roe as 
these more “wanted” cohorts reached the peak crime ages.   
Among academics, however, the notion that legalized abortion had a major impact on 
crime has been met with greater skepticism. Criminologists describe the association as novel or 
interesting but are dismissive.  They make the first-order observation that the timing between 
changes in age-specific crime rates and exposure to legalized abortion is inconsistent with the 
Donohue and Levitt story.  Economists on the other hand have gone further.  They have re-
estimated Donohue and Levitt’s regressions, altered the specifications, questioned the 
identification strategy and tested the association in other countries. Donohue and Levitt have 
responded with more data and further analyses.  Making sense of the competing regressions can 
be difficult even for the most experienced economists.
4  But what is often obscured in the 
statistical detail is the audacity of the claim: a causal relationship between abortion and crime 
based on an association between state aggregates separated by 20 years. Despite the simplicity of 
the empirics, many have found Donohue and Levitt’s evidence to be compelling.  
The association between abortion and crime, however, is more than an academic debate.  
The popularity of Freakonomics insures its notoriety, but a causal relationship between abortion 
and crime has far-reaching implications for policy.   First is the sheer numbers of lives saved.  
Homicides fell from 24,703 in 1991 to 15,586 in 2000.   If the legalization of abortion is 
                                                 
4 Daniel Hammermesh, a well-known and highly regarded labor economist said to Stephen Dubner, “ I’ve gone over 
this paper in draft, in its printed version, at great length, and for the life of me I can’t see anything wrong with it.  On 
the other hand, I don’t believe a word of it” (Dubner 2003)  
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responsible for half this decline, as Donohue and Levitt suggest, then over 21,000 murders were 
averted over the decade.  But the potential welfare gains go beyond crime.  If abortion increases 
the “wantedness” of cohorts, which in turn lowers crime, then we also should observe 
improvements across a panoply of outcomes: teen pregnancy, school achievement, drug 
addiction, depression, divorce, etc.  Moreover, abortion represents just one form of fertility 
control.  If the driving force is unwanted births averted, then we should be able to achieve many 
of these gains by improving family planning generally.   Thus, increases in the use of 
contraception or the promotion of abstinence among teens should have similarly positive effects.   
Put simply, the policy implications of a causal relationship between abortion and crime are so 
far-reaching and yet so controversial, that anything less than a thorough vetting borders on social 
science negligence. 
Literally thousands of regressions relating crime to abortion have been estimated in the 
course of the debate.
5  The statistical work, however, may have done more to obfuscate what 
appears obvious from time-series of age-specific crime rates: cohorts exposed to legalized 
abortion committed crimes at roughly the same rate at those who were unexposed.  Donohue and 
Levitt never present this first-order evidence.  They contend that national time-series of age-
specific crime rates are uninformative or that the violence associated with the development and 
spread of crack cocaine markets obscures the positive effect of abortion.  And yet, they argue 
that the effect of abortion is large—so large in fact that it can explain half of the dramatic decline 
in homicide rates between 1991 and 1997.  They never address why effects this large are not 
more evident in the age-specific crime rates.
  
                                                 
5 Lott and Whitley (2007) write, “Of the over 6,000 regressions that we estimated here, only one implied even a 
small reduction in the murder rate” (p. 323).   
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I begin this review by describing the conceptual foundation of the Donohue and Levitt 
(hereafter, DL) hypothesis.  I assess the evidence that links unwanted childbearing and adverse 
outcomes. I next present DL’s empirical model and results.  I then describe the published 
criticisms of DL’s work and DL’s responses.  In the final section I examine the association 
between abortion and crime in other countries.   I conclude that the most credible tests of 
abortion and crime in both the US and abroad do not support the DL hypothesis.  In the end, the 
simple time-series plots of age-specific arrest and homicide rates tell the story:  the crime rates of 
cohorts born just before abortion was legalized follow the same time path as the crime rates of 
those born just afterwards.   There is no discontinuity in crime rates associated with the early 
legalization of abortion in New York or California, nor is there a break in crime rates in the rest 
of the states after Roe.   Donohue and Levitt’s presentation of innumerable regression estimates 
divert attention from, rather than account for, the absence of this most basic evidence.  
 
I.  Conceptual Framework and Supporting Evidence 
  A simple place to start is with the following identity: 
) 1 ( * ) 1 ( *         ) 1 ( k k CR k CR k CR − − + =  
CRt,  is the total crime rate.  It is a weighted average of crime rates for high risk (k) and low risk 
(1-k) groups.   Examples of high risk groups would be individuals raised in poverty or in single-
parent households.  Abortion can affect the crime rate in two ways.   First, abortion may lower k, 
if, for example, teens or unmarried women have fewer children after abortion is legalized. 
Abortion may also affect crime by lowering the criminogenic propensity of individuals--a fall in 
CRk or CR(1-k) or both.  Children who are more wanted may receive more emotional support and 
greater investments in child health and human capital than their less wanted counterparts.    5
Donohue and Levitt  refer to these pathways as selection effects.  A third way in which abortion 
may lower crime is by reducing the size of a cohort.   As these cohorts reach their teens and early 
twenties, there will be fewer young males in the peak crime ages and less crime.  DL refer to this 
pathway as the cohort-size effect. 
6  
The conceptual association between abortion and crime relies on two relationships.  First, 
an increase in the abortion rate reduces the proportion of mistimed and unwanted births.
7 Second, 
individuals from pregnancies that were mistimed or unwanted at birth have a greater propensity 
to commit crime as adults.  Donohue and Levitt provide no direct evidence of either association, 
but rely on published studies.  For instance, research in the US demonstrates that the early 
legalization of abortion around 1970 in Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York and Washington is 
associated with a 5 percent decrease in fertility rates relative to states that legalized abortion with 
Roe in 1973 (Levine et al. 1999; Angrist and Evans 1999).  There is also evidence that the 
decline in fertility was greater among teens, unmarried and nonwhite women (Sklar and Berkov 
1974; Joyce and Mocan 1990; Levine et al. 1999; Angrist and Evans 1999).   Most analysts have 
interpreted the relative decline in fertility rates in the five pre-Roe states as a decrease in 
unwanted childbearing.  However, it is difficult to show that state abortion rates are inversely 
                                                 
6 Surprisingly, Donohue and Levitt (2001) make no attempt to distinguish selection from cohort effects in their 
state-year regressions of total crime rates.   Changes in cohort size would eventually affect the age structure, which 
is typically measured by including the proportion of the population in various age groups as a right-hand-side 
determinant of the crime rate.  Donohue and Levitt (2001) never include the age structure in the model.  However, in 
response to Foote and Goetz (2008) Donohue and Levitt (2008) regress the number of age-specific crimes and 
arrests (in logs) on the abortion rate.  They argue that the coefficient on the abortion rate in these regressions 
captures both the cohort size effect as well as selection effects.  They then estimate regressions of per capita arrests 
and contend that the coefficient on the abortion rates captures only selection effects.  The difference in the abortion 
coefficient between these two regressions is the cohort size effect.  Critics argue that a specification of log arrests on 
the abortion rates lacks justification and leads to spurious results (Foote and Goetz 2008; Joyce 2009).  I discuss this 
point in more detail below.  
 
7  Demographers divide unintended birth into two categories: those from pregnancies that were mistimed as 
compared to pregnancies that were unwanted.  The distinction is based on surveys generally conducted among 
women who have recently given birth.  Women are asked if they had wanted to become pregnant and if not, had the 
pregnancy been mistimed or had they not wanted to become pregnant ever again.   
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related to state fertility rates in the period after Roe.  Consider the fertility and abortion rates in 
Figure 1.  Each series is stratified by whether states legalized abortion before (pre-Roe states) or 
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Fig 1: Fertility and Abortion Rates by Roe and pre-Roe States
 
 
There is a large difference in abortion rates between pre-Roe and Roe states that persists well 
after 1973 with no corresponding difference in fertility rates.  One would expect higher abortion 
rates to be associated with lower fertility rates if, in fact, abortion reduced the rate of unwanted 
childbearing.  One explanation is that greater acceptance of abortion and greater availability of 
abortion services in the pre-Roe states lead to more sex and more pregnancies, but not 
necessarily fewer unwanted births (Klick and Stratmann 2003).
8  The lack of an association 
                                                 
8 Another noteworthy detail from Figure 1 is that fertility rates had been trending downwards through much of the 
1960s.  Indeed, the absolute decline in fertility rates between 1960 and 1969 exceeds the decline from 1970 to 1979.  
The possible increase in the “wantedness” of birth cohorts in the 1960s is never addressed by DL, even though the 
contraceptive pill and illegal abortion are likely to have had important effects on fertility.  Marvell and Moody   7
between abortion and fertility is relevant to the abortion and crime debate because DL only use 
data on abortions from 1973 to 1983.   If there is no association between state abortion and state 
fertility rates, then abortion improves well-being by lowering the prevalence of mistimed as 
opposed to unwanted births.   The association between mistimed births and adverse child 
development, however, is much weaker than the association between unwanted births and child 
well-being (Joyce, Kaestner, and Korenman  2000).    
  Some have argued that legalized abortion actually worsened the situation of some 
women.  Akerlof et al. (1996) develop a model in which the legalization of abortion leads to a 
rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing, since it frees men from having to legitimize a pre-marital 
conception. The model fits the basic time-series well.  The ratio of births to unmarried women 
rose from 7.7 percent of births to 17.8 percent between 1965 and 1980 (Ventura et al. 1995).  
Lott and Whitley (2007) use this argument to explain why abortion is positively related to 
homicide rates in direct contradiction to DL.  In other words, the notion that states with greater 
abortion rates have lower rates of unwanted childbearing is more ambiguous than DL suggest.  
The second relationship that links abortion to crime is the association between unwanted 
childbearing and criminogenic adults.  Again the literature is far from definitive.  The most 
widely cited studies are from Europe in which the outcomes of children from pregnancies in 
which the women were denied abortions are compared to children from pregnancies that were 
wanted (David et al. 1988).  The general finding is that children from unwanted pregnancies do 
worse in school, have less stable employment, and more mental health problems as teens and 
young adults than their counterparts who were wanted from conceptions. The internal validity of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1991) show that the proportion of the population 15 to 24 years of age fell every year from 1977-1990, the result of 
declining fertility rates in 1960s.  Certainly this would quality as a “cohort effect” as defined by DL.  However, the 
time-series relationship between the age structure and crime rates over this period is ambiguous, which suggest that 
the “cohort effect” may not be important.   
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these studies rests critically on the comparison group.  Children who were unwanted are 
compared to children from families in which the child was wanted.  Comparisons between 
children from different families are vulnerable to confounding from hard to measure differences 
in family environment.  It is noteworthy that the negative effects of “unwantedness” in the 
Prague cohort—the most widely cited of this type—were largely eliminated when the authors 
used sibling differences to net out family fixed effects (Kubicka et al. 1995). 
In the US, measures of unintended childbearing are based largely on surveys of women 
who give birth (Brown and Eisenberg 1995).  Women are asked after the birth if they had wanted 
to become pregnant and if not, had the pregnancy been mistimed or had they not wanted to 
become pregnant ever again. The retrospective aspect of the question is problematic since 
attitudes towards pregnancy and birth can change between conception and the postpartum 
interview.   This ambiguity has led economists to rely on abortion as the most clear-cut indicator 
of an unwanted pregnancy.  The difficulty is that there can be no direct association between the 
aborted fetus and subsequent outcomes.  This creates a profound problem of missing data 
(DiNardo 2007). Economists, as one might suspect, have not been deterred.  Grossman and Joyce 
(1990), for example, treat births as a censored sample of pregnancies.  They use a Heckman-
correction procedure to estimate the expected birth weight of pregnancies that were aborted had 
they not been terminated.  They find that the mean birth weight of black births in New York City 
would have been 60 grams lower had all pregnancies to black women been carried to term.  The 
analysis was a novel application of a censored regression, but the identification restrictions were 
largely ad hoc and would not be credible today.   
Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) also estimate the effect of abortion on the child not 
born by associating marginal changes in child outcomes with marginal changes in births.  They   9
use abortion legalization as an instrument for birth rates so as to isolate variation associated with 
the child not born (the “marginal child”).  Their estimates suggest that children who were not 
born because abortion became legal were more likely to be low birth weight, experience poverty 
and be on welfare.  In a follow-up study that uses the 2000 census, the authors report inconsistent 
associations between abortion and adult well-being.   They find that the marginal child as an 
adult is more likely to be on welfare and less likely to graduate from college, but she is no more 
likely to live in poverty, to drop out of high school, to be unemployed or to have been 
incarcerated (Ananat et al. 2009).   
Angrist and Evans (1999) also exploit the exogenous variation induced by the 
legalization of abortion in the pre-Roe states.  They find significant declines in black fertility 
rates and reduced-form effects of legalization on the schooling of black women.   They find 
small effects on teen fertility among whites and no effects on schooling.  Angrist and Evans 
(1999) also find no effect of national legalization of abortion in 1973 on the fertility rates of 
either white or black teens.  They conclude that changes in downstream outcomes may be too 
small to measure statistically, even with relatively large changes in black teen fertility rates 
associated the pre-Roe legalization of abortion.  
  Charles and Stephens (2006) reach different conclusions.  They find that the early 
legalization of abortion is associated with very large decreases in the illicit substance use.  
Among the exposed cohorts, they find that illicit drug use would have been 35 to 57 percentage 
points higher among what Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) term the “marginal child” or the 
fetus not born.  These are huge effects given a mean rate of use of 10 percent—an order of 
magnitude greater than the changes in child well-being found by Gruber, Levine and Staiger 
(1999).    Moreover, Charles and Stephens only have a single age group.   They can’t exploit age   10
differences to estimate the triple difference strategy of Joyce (2004, 2009) or the inclusion of 
state-year effects as used by Donohue and Levitt (2008) and Foote and Goetz (2008).   Instead 
they add linear state-specific trends to control for period effects, which reduce their estimates by 
half.  But trends in illicit drug use are clearly curvilinear and thus, more complete controls for 
state-effects might have reduced their estimates even further.
9  Finally, Charles and Stephens 
regress illicit drug use on lagged abortion rates, a specification more consistent with DL.   
Although the coefficient on the abortion rate is negative, the t-ratio is less than one.   
Hotz, McElroy and Sanders (2005) use spontaneous abortion among teens to generate the 
counterfactual for teens that give birth.   They compare the outcomes of four groups of teens: 
those who give birth; those who became pregnant but who spontaneously abort; teens who 
terminate their pregnancies voluntarily; and teens who don’t become pregnant.  They find that 
many of the consequences of teen childbearing are short lived and gone by age 28.  There are no 
differences in completed schooling, earnings, or the number of children by age 28 between teen 
mothers and teens who were pregnant but who delayed birth until after 18 years of age because 
of a miscarriage.  Moreover, the characteristics of teens who abort are more similar to those who 
never become pregnant than those who are pregnant and either carry to term or spontaneously 
aborted.  Hotz et al. (2005) conclude that consequences of teen childbearing, or the gains to 
delayed teen childbearing, among latent teen mothers have been greatly overestimated.  
There is little debate that children who are abused, children from unstable families and 
children in poverty are at greater risk of committing crimes as teens and adults than children 
from more nurturing settings.  Donohue and Levitt’s argument is that abortion reduces the 
likelihood that children grow up in such circumstances.   The selected review of the literature 
                                                 
9 See Figure 1 in Charles and Stephens (2006). 
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just presented is mixed.   There is convincing evidence that early legalization of abortion lead to 
a decrease in fertility.   There is some evidence that the circumstances and subsequent outcomes 
of cohorts exposed the early legalization of abortion improved.   There is less evidence that the 
widespread diffusion of abortion services had a similar impact.  Indeed, the model by Akerlof, 
Yellen and Katz (1996) offers a compelling argument that abortion legalization contributed to 
the rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing, which may have worsened circumstances of children 
born to women unwilling to abort. 
 
Outline of a Structural Model     
The focus on “wantedness” and child well-being, however, has obscured the larger issue 
that abortion is but one of a series of decisions related to sexual activity, contraception, marriage 
and labor supply.   Donohue and Levitt treat the lagged abortion rate as an exogenously 
determined proxy for unwanted births averted.  But unintended childbearing is imbedded in a 
complex structural model.
10   To illustrate, consider the stylized model below. 
                                                 
10 Levitt acknowledges the complexity in a posting on his blog.  He writes, “The total number of unwanted births is 
equal to the number of unwanted conceptions times the fraction of women who don’t abort those unwanted 
pregnancies. Let’s assume that a woman who has conceived an unwanted pregnancy is equally likely to get an 
abortion in the 1990s or the 1970s, but that because of fear of AIDS, people use condoms and have fewer unwanted 
conceptions. With fewer unwanted conceptions, there will be both fewer abortions and fewer unwanted births. In 
that case, lower 1990s abortions are a harbinger of future crime reductions, not future crime increases” (Posted June 
15, 2006 at http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/06/15/steve-sailer-asks-an-excellent-question/). 
The argument goes both ways, of course.   Assume the 1970s were a time of changing mores about sex which lead 
to increased sexual activity.  According to Levitt’s statement, the demand for abortion shifts to the right resulting in 
more abortions and more unwanted births, consistent with Akerlof et al. (1996) and Lott and Whitley (2007). 
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Let Ct be the crime rate in year t of age group a; let UWt-a be the rate of unwanted childbearing in 
year t-a. For simplification, ignore all other determinants of crime except unwanted childbearing.  
Let Art-a-1 be the abortion rate in year t-a-1, let Pillt-a-1 be the rate of pill use at time t-a-1; let St-a-1 
be the rate of sexual activity; let PA t-a-1 be the price of abortion in year t-a-1, let PP be the price 
of the pill .  Note that I have ignored equations for marriage and labor force participation as well 
prices associated with birthing and work.  Donohue and Levitt regress Ct on ARt-a-1 as if it were a 
reduced form.  Certainly, abortion is pre-determined, but the decision to abort may be made 
simultaneously with the decision to have sex, use contraception and bear children.  A more 
realistic reduced form is probably equation (7), but even this is problematic unless the price of 
abortion, PA t-a-1, varies exogenously and PPt-a-1 is assumed to remain unchanged.  However, 
sexual mores and access to the pill among unmarried women were changing rapidly in the early 
1970s, which further complicates the model.  Another complication is that the availability of 
abortion services is also endogenous.  Soon after legalization, markets for abortion services 
developed.   Abortion providers located where demand was strongest and attitudes most 
hospitable.    13
The upshot is that designing a credible test of whether legalized abortion lowered crime is 
extremely challenging.  Variation in abortion over time may not be a good estimate of changes in 
unwanted childbearing.  Indeed, Levitt argues that only movements along the demand curve for 
abortion correctly identify changes in unwanted childbearing.  Shifts in the demand curve for 
abortion can increase or decrease the proportion of unwanted births (see footnote 10).  Thus, any 
model that purports to link abortion to crime must identify changes in abortion induced by shifts 
in the supply curve of abortion services only.   Donohue and Levitt’s identification strategy never 
addresses this issue.  As I show in the next section, they assume that all variation in abortion 
between 1973 and 1983 represents movement along the demand curve. 
 
II. Donohue and Levitt’s empirical strategy 
  Donohue and Levitt present five pieces of evidence consistent with an association 
between legalized abortion and crime (DL 2001; 2004).
11   Two involve national time series.  
The first shows that total crime rates, not age-specific crime rates, fell earlier in the pre-Roe 
states relative to states that legalized abortion with Roe.   The second demonstrates that crime 
rates fell further in states with greater abortion rates in 1970s.  The next three pieces of evidence 
involve regression analysis, but their main results involve regressions of total crime rates at the 
state-year level from 1985-1997 on a proxy for cohort exposure to abortion also at the state-year 
                                                 
11 Steven Levitt has made extensive use of the internet to promote his book and share his thoughts.  In a three-part 
video presentation which is part of his audio book, Levitt describes how they came to the hypothesis that abortion 
lowered crime and why he believes the association is causal. Levitt acknowledges that no one piece of evidence 
relating abortion and crime is “completely convincing.”  Donohue and he rely on a “collage” of evidence that 
together convinces them that abortion did indeed lower crime 
(http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/more-video-on-abortioncrime-a-collage-of-evidence/). 
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level.   The latter they term the “effective abortion rate” (EAR).
 12  It is critical to emphasize that 
DL cannot identify cohorts with these state-year regressions because the crime rate is not age-
specific.  The EAR is an attempt to overcome this limitation.   To illustrate, consider equation (9)  
∑ = −
a
total a sa st st Arrests Arrests Abortion EAR ) / ( *       ) 9 (  
Subscript “a” indexes age, “s” state and “t” year.  The abortion rate in 1985 in state “s,” for 
example, is the sum of state abortion rates “a” years ago where “a” varies from 10 to 29.  Thus, 
the EAR for murder in 1985 is the number of abortions per birth (the abortion rate) in 1975 
weighted by the proportion of arrests for murder of 10-year olds plus the abortion rate in 1974 
weighted by proportion of arrests for murder of 11-year olds plus the abortion rate in 1973 
weighted by the proportion of arrests for murder of 12-year olds and so on up to age 29.   The 
last term of this sum for the EAR in 1985 is the abortion rate in 1956 (1985-29) weighted by the 
proportion of arrests for murder to 29-year olds.  The arrest weights are based on national counts 
in 1985 and are fixed for all years.   Donohue and Levitt use no data on abortions prior to 1973 
and assume the abortion rate to be zero.
13  Thus, the EAR is zero or near zero for period 1985-
1990 because either the abortion rate is zero for most cohorts or the proportion of arrests to a 
particular age group is inconsequential.
14  With the EAR in hand, DL estimate in the following: 
                                                 
12 Donohue and Levitt (2001, 2004, 2008) refer to the ratio of abortions to births as the abortion rate.  Demographers 
refer to the abortion rate as the ratio of abortions to women 15 to 44 years of age.   For consistency with Donohue 
and Levitt, I will refer to the ratio of abortions to births as the abortion rate unless specifically noted otherwise.  
 
13 Actually, they backcast abortions in 1973 to 1970 for the 5 states that legalized abortion prior to Roe.  The other 
45 states are assumed to have zero abortion rates.   As Joyce (2004, 2009) and Lott and Whitley (2007) show 
abortion was not zero in the other 45 states prior to Roe.   Moreover, the rate of illegal abortion was also not zero 
prior to Roe. Their assumption that there were no abortions prior to 1973, whether legal or illegal, implies that there 
was no variation in unwanted childbearing prior to 1973, an assumption clearly at odds with the decline in fertility 
rates in 1960s (see Figure 1).   
 
14 The abortion rate was never zero prior to legalization.  Tietze (1973), for instance, estimates that two-thirds of all 
illegal abortions in New York City were replaced by legal abortions in the first year of legalization. 
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t s st st EAR CR τ λ β + + + = Xα *     ) 10 (  
in which CR is the state-year crime rate, X is a vector of other determinants, λ and τ capture state 
and year fixed effects.  Donohue and Levitt (2004) estimate the coefficient on β to be –0.166 (t-
ratio =3.01) when the dependent variable is the murder rate.
 15   An increase in the EAR of 100, 
approximately one standard deviation in the EAR in 1997, is associated with a 16.6 percent 
decline in the murder rate.  Since the murder rate fell by 31 percent between 1991 and 1997, 
legalized abortion can account for over half the decline.  Regressions of the violent crime rate 
and the property crime rate on the respective EARs yield roughly similar results.  The 
coefficients of the EAR are statistically significant and insensitive to the inclusion of the other 
determinants (X) (see Tables IV and V in DL 2001 and Table 1 in DL 2004).  These are the 
results that are used by Donohue and Levitt when describing their findings to other academics 
and the general public. 
  At first, the EAR may seem a clever way to reduce what should be an age-period-cohort 
analysis to a pooled time-series, cross-section of state aggregates.  Yet, it is impossible to 
credibly identify a cohort effect without age-specific crime rates.  Thus, the value of these 
regressions as a causal test of abortion and crime is questionable (DiNardo 2007; Foote and 
Goetz 2008; Joyce 2009).  Indeed, it is not clear that DL’s conclusions would have been as well 
received in the research community if the statistical association between abortion and crime had 
been limited to regressions of total crime rates on the EAR.  Thus, DL bolster their argument 
                                                 
15 See Table 1 in Donohue and Levitt (2004).  This coefficient is from a regression in which the EAR uses abortions 
by state of residence instead of abortion by state of occurrence.  Joyce (2004) had criticized DL for measuring 
abortion by state of occurrence. 
      16
with an analysis of age-specific arrests as a function of lagged abortion rates.
 16   The basic 
specification can be written as follows:  
                1       ) 11 ( ajt t j a a jt ajt e A A LnC + + + + = − − λ χ β  
where Cajt is the natural logarithm of arrests or homicides for age group a, in state j, and year t; 
Ajt-a-1 is the state abortion rate in year t-a-1.  There are fixed effects for Age (A), states (χ) and 
year (λt ).  Thus, arrests of 24-year olds in 1990 in state j, for example, are correlated with the 
abortion rate in state j in 1965 (t-24-1).
17 The strength of the analysis is that each birth cohort is 
associated with the abortion rate that existed roughly the year in which the cohort was in utero.  
This represents a major improvement over regressions of the total crime rate on the EAR, since 
the link between the “exposure” (legalized abortion) and the outcome (the crime rate) is more 
direct.    
 Data on arrests by single year of age are available for individuals 15 to 24 years of age 
from FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.  Donohue and Levitt (2001, 2004, 2008) analyze arrests for 
violent crime (murder and non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault and 
robbery) and property crime (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson) by single 
year age for the years 1985-1996.  There are potentially 6120 cells by age, state and year.  
Results from these regressions are consistent with the DL hypothesis (Donohue and Levitt 2001, 
Table 7).   Specifically, an increase in the abortion rate of 100 per 1000 live births would lower 
arrests for violent crime by 2.8 percent (t-ratio -7.0) and arrests for property crime by 4.0 percent 
(t-ratio = -10.0).  In an effort to scale the results, DL multiply the coefficients by 350, which 
                                                 
16  Donohue and Levitt’s 1999 manuscript on abortion and crime that was featured in the Chicago Tribune did not 
include an analysis of age-specific arrest rates.   The latter was added to the article that was published in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
 
17 The lag structure of the abortion rate is modified slightly in Donohue and Levitt (2008). 
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represents the difference in the abortion rate between states in the upper and lower tercile of 
abortion frequency (Donohue and Levitt 2001, p. 412).   As such, abortion is associated with a 
decline of between 10 and 14 percent in age-specific arrest rates.
18     
The results from age-specific arrests provided important support for the state-year 
regressions of total crime rates.   However, a more transparent presentation of the data should 
have begun with simple time-series plots of age-specific arrest and crime rates.  Such figures are 
at odds with the timing of legalization and the downturn in crime.  Critics of the DL have raised 
this point repeatedly, but it’s worth expanding upon (Fox 2000; Joyce 2004, 2009; Lott and 
Whitley 2007; Cook and Laub 2002; Rosenfeld 2004; Zimring 2006).  Donohue and Levitt’s are 
trying to identify cohort effects associated with legalized abortion amidst profound period and 
age effects that were evident in the 1980s and 1990s.  Fortunately, strong cohort effects present 
in a distinct manner.  To illustrate, consider a hypothetical series of murder rates by single-year 
of age for individuals 16 to 20 years (Figure 2).  Assume the rates pertain to the states that 
legalized abortion in 1970, three years prior to Roe.  The vertical line represents the point at 
 
                                                 
18 The scaling is overly generous.  No cohort was ever exposed to a change in abortion rate of 350 per 1000 live 
births.  The estimates from regressions of age-specific arrests are based on within-state changes in abortion and 
arrests.  As Joyce (2009) shows, the largest increase in abortion rates occurred between 1972 and 1974.  Joyce 
estimates the change at approximately 150 abortions per 1000 live births in the states that legalized abortion with 
Roe.   Cohorts born later experienced smaller changes.  If I use 150 as a generous scaling, then abortion is associated 
with decreases of 4 to 6 percent in arrests.   












1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
16 yrs 17 yrs
18 yrs 19 yrs
20 yrs
Example of Cohort Effects
Fig 2: Hypothetical Homicide Rates by Age
 
 
which the first cohort of 16-year olds that were exposed to legalized abortion in the pre-Roe 
states (the 1971 birth cohort).  In this simulated example, the murder rate of 16-year olds begins 
to flatten after 1987 while the murder rate of the other age groups continues to rise.  The change 
in trajectory among 17-year olds occurs one year later as the 1971 birth cohort ages, followed by 
a change in the homicide rate of 18 year olds, and so on.
19   Note that cohort effects remain 
evident even in the presence of strong age and period effects.  In Figure 3, I show the same set of 
simulated murder rates with clear age and period effects but absent any cohort effect.   
 
                                                 
19 Donohue and Levitt are clearly aware of this pattern.  They write, “ If abortion legalization reduces crime, then we 
should see the reduction begin with, say, fifteen year-olds, about sixteen years after legalization, then extend to 
sixteen year-olds a year later, and so on (Donohue and Levitt 2001, p. 411). 
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Fig 3: Hypothetical Homicide Rates by Age
 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of dominant period effects is the coincident movement and 
turning point in the series.  In this example, the homicide rate of each age group peaks around 
1990 and then declines.   Now consider actual homicide rates.   Figure 4 shows the homicide 
offending rates in the pre-Roe states based on the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR, 
Fox 2007).
20   As before, the vertical line shows the year after which the effect of legalized 
abortion should begin to show among 16-year olds.   
 
                                                 
20 The SHR offending data have strengths and limitations.   The SHR has homicides by age over a wider range than 
the arrest data used by Donohue and Levitt.  However there are a substantial number of missing observations in 
addition to some states with obviously incomplete reports.   Just over 26 percent of the records have no information 
about the perpetrator (Fox 2007).  In addition, I dropped selected years due to questionable reports from DC, FL, IA, 
KS, KY, MT and ND.  As a check on the SHR, I also plotted homicide victimization rates as collected by National 
Center for Health Statistics.   The national mortality files are considered the most complete census of death to non-
negligent homicide.   The problem with mortality files is that victims are not perpetrators.  Nevertheless as shown  in 
the Appendix, the time-series pattern to the homicide victimization rates is very similar to the offending series.   
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Fig 4: Homicide Rates by Age--pre-Roe States
 
 
 Although the murder offending rates from the pre-Roe states are rather noisy, there is no 
evidence of any cohort effect.  Indeed the homicide rate of 16-year olds climbs rapidly after 1987 
as do the homicide rates of the other age groups.   Figure 5 displays the actual homicide 
offending rates in the 45 states that legalized abortion with Roe.  The series are smoother which 
makes the dramatic period effects more obvious.  Again, there is no evidence of any cohort 
effect.  Similar presentations for age-specific arrest rates are equally unsupportive of DLs’ 
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Fig 5: Homicide Rates by Age--45 Roe States
 
 
  Donohue and Levitt regard the age-specific crime rates as unpersuasive.  They contend 
that the upsurge in violence associated with crack-cocaine markets obscures the positive effects 
of abortion.  But their response is unjustified given the magnitude of their estimated effects.  To 
illustrate, note that an increase of one standard deviation in the EAR in 1997—an increase of 100 
abortions per 1000 births—would be expected to lower the total homicide rate by 16.6 percent 
based on their reported estimates (DL 2004, Table 1, column 2).   Approximately 50 percent of 
all murders in 1997 were committed by individuals who were born before abortion became legal, 
and thus, the full impact of legalized abortion will not be felt until roughly 2017 (Donohue and 
Levitt 2001, p. 415).  In other words, the 16.6 percent decrease in the total homicide rate that is 
attributable to legalized abortion is driven by criminals roughly 25 years of age or less.  
Accordingly, the impact of legalized abortion on the homicide rate of any newly exposed cohort   22
is, on average, 33.2 percent (16.6% /0.50).  Donohue and Levitt confirm this expectation when 
they introduce the analysis of age-specific arrest rates.  They write, “On average, about half of 
those arrested are under the age of 25. Thus, to generate the crime reduction in Table IV (the 
16.6 percent above) requires coefficients on young arrests that are twice as large as the 
coefficients on overall crime” (Donohue and Levitt 2001, p. 410; author’s insertion in italics).
   
Based on DL’s coefficients, I estimate that a one-standard deviation increase in the actual 
abortion in 1973 would be expected to reduce the homicide rate of 16-year olds in 1987 by 7.9 
per 100,000 below its expected trajectory in the absence of legalization.
21   A decline this large 
would be unmistakable in the time-series plots. 
  Donohue and Levitt also argue that plots of age-specific crime rates are not informative 
because one must follow cohorts over the life-cycle in order to capture the effect of abortion on 
crime (DL 2004).
22  This objection can be accommodated with plots of homicide offending rates 
of older age groups, those 27 to 30 years of age.  Figure 6 shows the time-series for the pre-Roe 
states and Figure 7 the Roe states.  In both figures, the vertical line marks the point at which the 
first cohort of 27-year olds (those born in 1971 in the pre-Roe States and 1974 in the Roe states) 
would have been exposed to legalized abortion in utero. One advantage of the older age 
                                                 
21  A one-standard deviation in the actual abortion rate between 1971 and 1974 is 150 abortions per 1000 live births 
(Joyce 2009).   The homicide rate of 16-year olds in 1987 in the pre-Roe states is 15.8 per 100,000, up from 11.6 in 
1986.  If an increase in the abortion rate 100 per 1000 live births is expected to lower homicide for newly exposed 
cohort by 33.2 percent, then an increase in the abortion rate of 150 would be expected to lower homicide rates by 7.9 
per 100,000 [.332*1.50*15.8=7.9].  Since homicide rates were trending upward at approximately 4 per 100,000 per 
year prior to legalized abortions, the expected homicide rate of 16-year olds in the pre-Roe states in 1987 would be 
about 8.0, a change that clearly would be evident in Figure 4.  
 
22 Donohue and Levitt (2004, Table 2) made this argument in response to Joyce’s (2004) difference-in-differences-
in-differences (DDD) estimates.   The title of  DL’s Table 2 refers to “Changes in the Log Homicide Rate for 
Cohorts 70-75…”  But DL use log homicides and not log homicide rates.   As I discuss below there is no 
justification for a regression in log levels.   Foote and Goetz (2008) show that such models are likely to yield 
spurious results.   Moreover, they are especially flawed in the context of a DDD estimator in which the baseline 
difference in the number of homicides between the 5 pre-Roe states and the 46 Roe states (including DC) is large.   
Indeed, when Joyce replicates DL’s Table 2 but with log homicide rates instead of log homicides, there is no effect 
of legalized abortion on the homicide rate (see Joyce 2004b, Table 2).  
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groups is that the strong period effects associated with crack cocaine are absent. In neither figure 
is their evidence of any cohort effect.  Thus, regardless of whether I look at the 1971-1974 birth 
cohorts in their teens or as adults, there is no suggestion of any discontinuity in crime associated 
with legalized abortion.  
Since publication of their seminal paper in 2001, Donohue and Levitt have responded to 
critics by revising the measure of the abortion rate, modifying the specification and estimating 
the regressions over different time periods.  In each case, they conclude that their essential 
finding stands: the legalization of abortion in 1973 is a major reason why crime fell so 
substantially in 1990s.   The critics believe otherwise.  
 
III. Responses to the Donohue and Levitt Hypothesis 
  The most detailed responses to DL have come from within the economics profession.
23   
Joyce (2004, 2009), Lott and Whitley (2007) and Foote and Goetz (2008) each have replicated 
DL findings and then tested the sensitivity of the estimates to modifications.  The debate often 
reduces to dueling regressions, which can be numbing to observers not enmeshed in the issues. I 
will try to avoid such a result in my review to the debate.  I will also describe two studies that 
have attempted to replicate DL’s findings in Canada (Sen 2007) and the United Kingdom 
                                                 
23 Criminologists have also weighed in on the debate, but their comments have not figured prominently in the 
exchange among economists. This is unfortunate since criminologists make the straightforward point that the 
downturn in age-specific crime rates does not line up with the cohort’s exposure to legalized abortion (Fox 2000; 
Cook and Laub 2002; Rosenfeld 2005; Wilson 2005; Blumstein and Wallman 2006).   DL dismiss this evidence 
which is ironic since DL present more aggregated time series on total crimes rates in support of  their hypothesis 
(see Donohue and Levitt 2001, Figures 1 and 2).  Zimring (2006) offers a broader criticism of the DL hypothesis.  
Zimring uses national trends in fertility by age, race and marital status to show that there has been a seemingly 
uninterrupted rise in the percent of births to unmarried women and teens between 1965 and 1980.  The percent of 
births to African Americans has risen modestly.  Based on these trends Zimring asks, “How can more babies born to 
single mothers aged under 19 generate fewer crimes when they grow up?  How can a stable or larger group of poor 
children explain half a crime drop? It is here that the positive signs on the demographic arithmetic of risk categories 
are particularly troublesome” (Zimring 2006, p. 97). 
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(Kahane, Paton, Simmons 2007) as well work by  Dills, Miron and (2008), who provide 
descriptive evidence of the timing of abortion legalization and crime from 20 countries.  Lastly, I 
will discuss an analysis of an unprecedented national experiment in Romania in which a ban on 
abortion causes the birth rate to double within a year (Pop-Eleches 2006).   
Joyce: identification and specification 
In two articles, Joyce (2004, 2009) argues that DL’s empirical strategy is flawed along 
several dimensions.
24   First,  DL never articulate an identification strategy that is capable of 
distinguishing between changes in “wantedness” due to variation in abortion from changes in 
wantedness due to shifts in sexual activity, contraception, marital status, etc.   Donohue and 
Levitt use variation in state abortion rates as a proxy for variation in wantedness of a birth 
cohort.  But as outlined above, the relationship between crime and “wantedness” is embedded in 
a complex structural model that includes equations for sexual activity, contraception, marriage, 
and birthing [see equations (2)-(8) above].   In other words abortion is endogenous.  To give a 
simple example, teen fertility rates and teen abortion rates have both fallen substantially during 
the 1990s.  Does the substantial fall in teen abortion rates portend an upsurge in crime? The 
answer, by Levitt’s own admission, is no.  In an internet exchange Levitt was asked whether 
decreases in the abortion rate in the 1990s will increase crime 20 years later.  He responded that 
they would not because changes in abortion in the 1990s represented shifts in the demand for 
abortion as opposed to movements along the demand curve.  Only the latter, he argues, will be 
associated with changes in unwanted childbearing (Posted June 15, 2006 at 
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/06/15/steve-sailer-asks-an-excellent-question/ ).  In 
other words, the rate of unintended childbearing may fall in a period of falling abortion rates or 
                                                 
24 The Joyce-DL exchange in the Journal of Human Resources did not allow for rejoinders. Joyce (2009) used a 
follow up article to respond to some of the issues raised by DL (2004, 2008). 
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even zero abortion rates, if the decline in abortion rates results from increases in contraception or 
less sexual activity.   But DL never offer an empirical strategy that identifies shifts in the demand 
for abortion from movements along the demand curve.  They simply regress age-specific crimes 
and arrests from 1985-1998 on abortion rates from 1960 to 1983.   All variation in the abortion 
rate is assumed to represent movement along the demand curve for abortion and by assumption, 
changes in the “wantedness” of a cohort.   
A related difficulty with their empirical approach is that approximately 60 percent of 
cohorts included in their analysis are assigned a zero abortion rate.
25  Donohue and Levitt (2004) 
dismiss the issue.  They contend that zero abortions will only attenuate their estimates.  But the 
assumption of zero abortions is more consequential for it implies that there was no variation in 
the wantedness of cohorts born between 1961 and 1973.  This is certainly erroneous given the 
introduction of the pill, state variation in illegal abortions and the large drop in fertility rates in 
the 1960s (see Figure 1).  A simple alternative is to limit the analysis to cohorts for which data 
on abortion exists.  If DL are correct about the attenuation bias, then their results should be 
stronger in the more limited sample.  As I show below, their findings largely disappear with this 
sample restriction.  
A second major problem with DL’s empirical strategy relates to functional form.  
Donohue and Levitt (2001, 2004, 2008) use the log of arrests or the log of homicides as a 
dependent variable instead of the log of arrest or homicide rates.  Foote and Goetz (2008) and 
Joyce (2009) demonstrate that DL’s estimates become smaller, often have the wrong sign and are 
                                                 
25 Donohue and Levitt assume that the abortion rate is zero for individuals born between 1960 and 1973 (individuals 
born in 1973 are assigned the abortion rate in 1972). They use resident abortion rates from the Guttmacher Institute 
from 1973-1984.  In the 5 pre-Roe states they backcast the abortion rate from 1973 to 1970 and assume the abortion 
rate is zero from 1960-1969.  In the 45 Roe states and Washington, DC they assume the abortion rate was zero from 
1960-1972. 
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statistically insignificant if log arrest rates or log homicide rates are used instead of log counts.   
Donohue and Levitt (2008) concede the point, but contend that specifications with the log of age-
specific arrests or crimes capture both cohort and selection effects, whereas specifications with 
arrest or crimes rates estimate only selection effects.   They never explain how they arrive at such 
an assertion and it is difficult to derive a specification in which the level of crime is regressed on 
the abortion rate without a population offset.    Consider, for instance, a linear relationship 
between crime and wanted births at the individual level.  
(12)   a ijt ijt bW a C − + =  
Let Cijt be the number of crimes committed by individual i of age a, in state j and year t. Let Wijt-a 
be a dummy variable of whether this person was wanted at birth.
26  Now aggregate this model to 
the state level.  
(13)   a jt jt jt bW aN C − + =  
Let Njt be the number of people in state j of age a in year t.  Equation (13) represents a regression 
of the number of crimes in state j for a specific age group on the number of people in that age 
group and the number of individuals in that age group who were wanted at the time of birth.  One 
might interpret the coefficient on Njt as the cohort size effect and the coefficient on Wijt-a  as the 
selection effect.  However, this would only be true if there were no deaths or migration into or 
out of the state.  In other words, Njt would have to be the number of births (Bijt-a) “a” years ago in 
state “j”.   Moreover, this is a regression in which the number of crimes at the state level is 
                                                 
26 I use the demographer’s construct of intended and unintended births in which women are asked about their 
pregnancies after they give birth (see Institute of Medicine 1995).  However, if all unwanted pregnancies are 
aborted, then there is a profound problem of missing data at the individual level as noted by (DiNardo 2007).  This 
would still leave mistimed births, which are an important component of DL’s argument.  
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regressed on the state population and the number of unwanted births “a” years ago.   To obtain a 
specification that uses the abortion rate, divide through by population, Njt and treat Njt and  
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The results is a regression of the state crime rate (CRjt) on the rate of wanted childbearing (Wjt-a).  
This is the specification estimated by Joyce (2004, 2009), Lott and Whitley (2007) and Foote and 
Goetz (2008).  Donohue and Levitt (2001, 2004), by contrast, use the ratio of abortions to births 







− + =       ) 16 (  
They offer no justification for the specification in equation (16); nor is it clear how to interpret, 
b, the coefficient on the abortion rate.  Foote and Goetz (2008) make the additional point that the 
relationship between Cjt and Ajt-a/Bjt-a will be negative by construction.  If Bjt-a is a proxy for the 
population in the state, Njt, then increases in Bjt-a unrelated to abortion will decrease the abortion 
rate but increase Cjt simply because more people are mechanically related to more crime.   In 
other words, the strong positive correlation between Bjt-a and Njt creates a negative and spurious 
relationship between the level of crime and the abortion rate.    
  The third issue related to DL’s empirical approach involves the use of instrumental 
variables to ameliorate problems of measurement error in the abortion rate.  In their most recent 
reply to Foote and Goetz (2008), Donohue and Levitt (2008) regress abortion rates by state of 
residence as estimated by the Guttmacher Institute on abortion rates by state of occurrence as   29
collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  They write, “If one has two noisy 
abortion measures but the measurement error in the two proxies is uncorrelated, instrumenting 
for one abortion proxy using the other will eliminate attenuation bias.  In this setting, the CDC’s 
independently generated measure of legalized abortions is likely to be an excellent instrument” 
(DL 2008, p. 430).    The strategy is flawed because researchers at the Guttmacher Institute 
estimate abortions by state of residence using the CDC’s estimate of abortions to out-of-state 
residents.
27  As Joyce (2009) details, errors in the CDC estimate of abortions to non-residents is 
built into the Guttmacher’s estimate of abortions by state of residence in potentially complicated 
ways.  In short, the fundamental assumption of DL’s IV strategy, that the measurement errors in 
the two proxies are independent, is untenable.  
  Lastly, both Joyce (2009) and Foote and Goetz (2008) point out that DL (2001) did not 
adjust the standard errors for serial correlation within-states over time in the regressions of age-
specific arrests or arrest rates.  Although this may seem like a second-order issue, adjusting the 
standard errors for positive serial correlation renders key estimates statistically insignificant.   
To illustrate the sensitivity of DL’s estimates to modifications in the specification, I   
replicate their published estimates and then alter the analysis as suggested by Joyce (2004, 2009) 
and Foote and Goetz (2008).   The results are presented in Table 1.   The figures are estimates of 
the coefficient on the abortion rate, β, from equation (11).  Each estimate is from a separate 
regression.  The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the log of the number of crimes or 
                                                 
27  The following describes how researchers use the CDC data to estimate the Guttmacher Institute’s count of 
abortions by state of residence. “.......resident abortions in each state were derived from data obtained from the 
CDC and from AGI’s abortion survey.  The first step was to calculate the percentage of each state’s abortions that 
occurred to residents of other states, using the CDC data.  This proportion was applied to AGI’s count of abortion 
occurring in each state to estimate the number of abortions occurring in each state to out-of-state residents.   The 
second step was to distribute the non-resident abortions to the appropriate states according to the percentage 
distribution of the state or residence of women obtaining abortions in each state for which data are reported to the 
CDC by the state health department (Henshaw and Van Vort 1992, p. 163). 
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arrests.  I contrast these results with estimates based on the log of crime or arrest rates [columns 
(2) & (4)]. The standard errors are adjusted serial correlation within states using Stata’s cluster 
procedure.  
 The coefficients in column (1) are supportive of the DL hypothesis.  All four coefficients 
are negative and two are statistically significant.  The estimates for violent and property crime 
arrests in column (1) replicate those from DL (2008, Table II).  But as Foote and Goetz (2008) 
argue, regressions of log arrests or log crimes on the abortion rate are likely to yield negative and 
spurious estimates. The results in column (2) support this suspicion. When the dependent 
variable is expressed as a rate, two of the four coefficients become positive and none is 
statistically significant.  Note that the estimates for violent and property crime arrests rates in 
column (2) also replicate those from DL (2008, Table II).   Even if the coefficient on abortion in 
the regression of violent crime arrest rates is considered marginally significant, the decrease 
associated with one-standard deviation in the abortion rate is only 3.5 percent, about a one-fifth 
the size of the effect expected by DL (see the discussion on the magnitude effects on pages 21-
22).  
The estimates in columns (3) and (4) follow from Joyce’s suggestion that DL limit the 
sample to cohorts for which data on abortion exist.   Donohue and Levitt contend that the 
inclusion of observations in which the abortion rate is zero should bias their estimates toward 
zero.  If true, then the negative association between abortion and crime should be stronger in 
columns (3) and (4).  A comparison of estimates in columns (1) and (3) and columns (2) and (4) 
undermines this argument.  Six of the eight coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are smaller than    31
 
 
Table 1. Estimated Effects of Abortion Rate on Age-specific Counts or Rates of Log 
Arrests and Log Homicide (in logs): Replication of Donohue and Levitt (2008) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    




  (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) 





2.  Property crime arrests  -0.024
* 0.001 -0.007 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) 
Effect of 1 SD Δ  [-0.040] [0.002] [-0.008] [0.006] 
 
    
 
 
3.  Murder arrests  -0.028  -0.004  -0.009  0.003 
  (0.025) (0.023) (0.077) (0.078) 
Effect of 1 SD Δ  [-0.046] [-0.007] [-0.011] [0.004] 
 
      
4.  Homicides  -0.022  0.006  0.037  0.048 
 (0.018)  ((0.018)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Effect of 1 SD Δ  [-0.036] [0.010] [0.044] [0.057] 
      
Dependent var counts or rates  Counts Rates Counts Rates 
Cohorts  1961-83 1961-83 1974-81 1974-81 
Figures in columns (1) and (2) and rows 1and 2 replicate results from Donohue and Levitt (2008, Table 2) 
for violent and property crime arrests and arrest rates.  The results for murder and homicide use the same 
specification. The unit of observation is the state-year-age cell. The sample in columns (1) and (2) covers 
the years 1985-1998, ages 15-24 and cohorts 1961-83. There are 6724 observations for violent crime arrests, 
6730 for property crime arrests, 5715 for murder arrests and 5851 for the homicide rate. The sample in 
columns (3) and (4) is limited to cohorts for whom abortion data exist in Donohue and Levitt (2008).  
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within state.  Effects of a one-standard deviation 
increase in the abortion rates is shown in brackets.  The weighted mean and standard deviation of the 
abortion rate for the samples in columns (1) and (2) are 1.35 and 1.65, respectively, and 3.02 and 1.19 for 
the samples in column (3). *p<.05   32
their counterparts in the full sample.  All six are statistically insignificant and four of the six have 
the wrong sign.
28     
Foote and Goetz: missing fixed effects 
Another major challenge to DL (2001) arose when two economists noticed an error in 
DL’s computer code.   In the description of their regression model, DL include state-year fixed 
effects, but omit these regressors in the actual estimation [see DL 2001, equation (3), p. 411].
29  
Most readers of Freakonomics would not appreciate the significance of the omission.  For 
applied economists, however, this was an important revelation.   Many had been impressed that 
DL’s estimates seemed robust to the inclusion of state-year fixed effects, which are often the 
only way to control for unobserved differences between states over time.   There is widespread 
agreement among analysts, including DL, that the unprecedented rise in homicides among teens 
and young adults between 1984 and 1992 was largely attributable to the mix of crack, gangs and 
guns (see Cook and Laub 1999; Blumstein and Wallman 2006).   Failure to adjust for these 
variables is likely to bias the association between abortion and crime.  But there is no credible 
measure of crack markets available across states and time that can be added to the regressions.  
One way to overcome the lack of explicit data is to include state-year fixed effects in the 
                                                 
28It is important to revisit Donohue and Levitt’s (2004) reply to Joyce in the Journal of Human Resources given that 
estimates based on regressions of log crimes on the abortion rate may yield spurious results.  For instance, in 
attempting to replicate Joyce’s analysis, DL used the number of arrests or homicides whereas Joyce estimates all 
models with arrest and homicide rates.  But the language Donohue and Levitt use to describe their results obscures 
the fact their regressions use log levels where as Joyce uses log rates as the dependent variable.   For instance, the 
title of Table 2 in DL (2004) reads, “Changes in the Log Homicide Rate for Cohorts 70-75 Relative to Cohorts 65-
70. Replication of Joyce Table 4. Using Multiple Available Six-Year Periods” (p. 43).  The dependent variable, 
however, is the log of homicides and not the log of homicide rates.  The title to Table VII in DL (2001) refers to 
arrest rates when again the actual dependent variable is arrests.   The same is true in Table 1 of DL (2004).  The 
bottom panel has the subtitle of arrest rates when again they are arrests not arrest rates.   Joyce (2004b) re-estimated 
Table 2 from DL (2004) with log homicide rates instead of log homicides and finds that the sum of the DDDs is 
small and statistically insignificant (see also Joyce 2009).   The results in Table 1 in the text above underscore the 
importance of the distinction between specifications with log levels versus log rates.     
 
29 To their credit, DL made their data and programs available on the internet.      33
regression.  Specifically, researchers add a dummy variable for each state-year data point.  If DL 
have 14 years of data across 51 states then they will add 650 dummy variables [13 years times 50 
states] to the regression.  The goal is to eliminate as potential confounders factors such as crack 
markets that can’t be explicitly measured.   As one might suspect, adding so many variables to 
the regression eliminates a great deal of variation from both crime and abortion.  But it is 
important to recall that DL claim to have uncovered a robust cohort effect (legalized abortion) 
amidst profound period effects.  If changes in cohort “wantedness” produce a noticeable break in 
crime, then state-year fixed effects should not obscure the finding.  An alternative approach that 
eliminates confounding from strong period effects relies on an explicit comparison group within 
each state that was unexposed to legalized abortion in utero but was subject to the same period 
effects as those who were exposed to legalized abortion in utero.  The “difference-in-
differences” between these two groups is an estimate of the effect of abortion on crime.
30  
Donohue and Levitt (2008) acknowledge that they inadvertently omitted state-year fixed 
effects from their regressions of age-specific arrests.  They also show that the omission has a 
substantial impact on their estimates.  Their original estimates are reduced by at least 50 percent 
when state-year fixed effects are added to the model (DL 2008, Table I).  For example, they 
originally report that an increase in the abortion rate of 100 abortions per 1000 live births is 
associated with a 1.8 percent reduction in arrests for violent crime (Donohue and Levitt 2001, 
Table VII).  With state-year fixed effects, the same increase in the abortion rates is associated 
                                                 
30 For instance, consider the homicide rates in Figure 4.  Joyce (2004, 2009) compares changes among 17 year olds 
between 1987 and 1989 to those among 19 year olds over the same period.  Seventeen-year olds in 1987 were in 
utero in 1969 and thus unexposed to legalized abortion in the pre-Roe states whereas seventeen-year olds in 1989 
were in utero in 1971 and thus exposed.   Nineteen-year olds in 1987 and 1989 in the pre-Roe stats were in utero in 
1967 and 1969, respectively, and thus unexposed to legalized abortion.  If the 1971 cohorts are more “wanted” as 
DL contend, then crime should fall or increase less than it does among 19-year olds.   The key to the difference-in-
differences is whether the comparison group is a credible counterfactual (see Meyer 1995).  
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with a 0.9 percent decrease in arrests.   Although the coefficient is statistically significant, the 
magnitude of the reduction in arrests is not substantial. 
 In their response to Foote and Goetz (2008), Donohue and Levitt (2008) do more than 
simply insert the missing regressors.   They revise their measure of abortion and re-estimate their 
models.  In their original article they had used abortions by state of occurrence.  This can be 
misleading, however, since many women travel out of state for an abortion especially in the early 
1970s.  The more appropriate measure is abortions by state of residence.  Donohue and Levitt 
(2008) further tweak the abortion rate with an adjustment for cross-state mobility between a 
person’s state of birth and their current state of residence.  They also instrument it with abortions 
as reported by the CDC.  The adjusted abortion measure increases the magnitude of the 
coefficients on the abortion rate substantially.  An increase in the abortion rate of 100 per 1000 
live births is expected to lower age-specific arrests by 5.5 percent in models with state-year fixed 
effects—an estimate six times greater than the coefficient with the original abortion measure.  
Foote and Goetz (2008), however, also question the appropriateness of using log arrests 
instead of log arrest rates as the dependent variable.  Foote and Goetz (2008) show that a 
specification of log arrests regressed on the abortion rate is likely to yield a negative but spurious 
association between abortion and crime. They further criticize DL for failure to adjust the 
standard errors for serial correlation.   Foote and Goetz’s (2008) preferred specification is a 
regression of log arrest rates on the abortion rate with state-year fixed effects and adjustments for 
serial correlation.   When Donohue and Levitt (2008) estimate the regressions suggested by 
Foote and Goetz (2008), their estimates become small and statistically insignificant.  As shown 
in Table 1 above (column (2), rows 1 and 2), the coefficient on the abortion rate in the violent   35
crime arrest rate regression is -0.021 (t-ratio is -1.62) and the coefficient in the property crime 
arrest rate model is 0.001 (t-ratio 0.20).  
Lott and Whitley: Abortion raises crime 
  In the third published challenge to Donohue and Levitt by economists, Lott and Whitley 
(2007) provide a detailed analysis of age-specific homicide offending rates to cohorts born 
between 1950 and 1988.   The paper is notable because Lott and Whitley argue that legalized 
abortion is expected to raise not lower the murder rate.   The theory is based on a paper by 
Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) in which legalized abortion leads to fewer “shotgun” marriages 
and more out-of-wedlock births.  The availability of safe, legal abortion allows men to insist that 
women terminate a pregnancy instead of offering marriage.  Women unwilling to terminate their 
pregnancies are more likely to raise the child alone.  The impoverishment of women reduces 
investment in their children’s human capital, which leads to later increases in crime.  The theory 
is consistent with national time-series on shotgun weddings and out-of-wedlock childbearing, 
and thus, provides an alternative to the DL hypothesis.   
  The Lott and Whitley paper is notable for several other reasons.   First, they present an 
extensive set of time-series plots of homicide offending rates by year and age or age and cohort 
stratified by states that legalized abortion before Roe or with Roe.   As argued by Joyce (2004, 
2009) and numerous criminologists (Cook and Laub 2002; Blumstein and Wallman 2006; 
Zimring 2006), the basic time-series are inconsistent with the DL story.  Lott and Whitley make 
this point forcefully as they compare homicide rates of adults 26 to 30 years of age between 1980 
and 1998.  If DL are correct, there should be a noticeable change in homicide rates among 26-
year olds approximately four years earlier than the change among 30-year olds.  Comparison of 
the adult homicide rates offers a compelling response to Donohue and Levitt (2004) argument 
that the crack epidemic obscures the impact of legalized abortion on age-specific crime rates.    36
The impact of crack was concentrated among teens and young adults between 1985 and 1992.   
There is little indication that crack had a significant impact on the homicide rates of older adults 
(see Figures 6 and 7 above).  
  Lott and Whitley also challenge DL’s assumption that abortion rates were zero before 
1973 in states that legalized abortion with Roe.  Lott and Whitley present abortion rates 
(abortions per 1000 live births) in selected states from 1969 to 1972 as collected by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, which they include in their regression analyses.   The third 
notable characteristic of the Lott and Whitley analysis is the use of count data models in the 
analysis of homicide rates.  Donohue and Levitt (2001) argue against an analysis of homicides 
because too many cells have zero observations.
31  The count data regressions overcome this 
objection (see also Joyce 2009).  
  Lott and Whitley (2007) specify a regression model with an extensive set of controls.  
The basic specification includes measures of the prison population, execution rate, arrest rate, 
right-to-carry laws, unemployment rate, poverty rate, per capital income, population density as 
well as state and year fixed effects.  An increase in the abortion rate from zero to its 1980 level is 
associated with an approximately 25 percent increase in the homicide rate. They perform 
extensive sensitivity tests and report that coefficient on the abortion rate was negative only once 
in over 6000 regressions (Lott and Whitley 2007, p.323). 
    Lott and Whitley’s regression analysis is the least appealing aspect of the paper.   First, 
they greatly expand the number of age groups and cohorts. They analyze homicide offending 
rates from 1980 to 1998  by single year of age for those 10 to 30 years old as well adults 31 years 
and older as a single group.  There are potentially 26,979 cells by age, state and year of birth as 
                                                 
31 However, DL use homicides (not homicide rates) to bolster their case against Joyce (2004).    37
compared to the 6120 potential cells in Donohue and Levitt (2001).  But many of the additional 
cells added by Lott and Whitley have no information about abortion, and thus, tell us little about 
the abortion crime association.  For example, the homicide rate in 1980 pertains to cohorts born 
from 1950 to 1970.  Only 4 of the possible 1122 age-state-year-of-birth cells have an abortion 
rate paired with a 1980 homicide rate.   In short, Lott and Whitley have only worsened the 
problem of zero cells that characterized DL’s approach.  The large number of cells also creates a 
false sense of precision as the standard errors are artificially reduced.  Finally, Lott and Whitley 
should be applauded for collecting additional data on abortion from the CDC, but they make the 
mistake of using abortions by state of occurrence instead of abortions by state of residence.   
Consequently, they greatly overestimate abortions in some states and underestimate them in 
others.  For instance, 60 percent of 255,000 abortions obtained in New York in 1971 were to 
non-residents of the state (CDC 1972).         
Seeing the Forest from the Trees 
  Donohue and Levitt (2004, 2008) provide seemingly convincing responses to their critics.   
In Table 3 of their response to Joyce, 8 of the 8 coefficients on the abortion rate are negative and 
six are statistically significant.   In Table II in their response to Foote and Goetz, 15 of the 18 
coefficients are negative and 11 are statistically significant.  But many of DL’s specifications are 
inappropriate and should not be considered.   For instance, in their response to Joyce, DL analyze 
only the log of arrests and homicides and not arrest or homicide rates; nor do they include state-
year fixed effects.  In their response to Foote and Goetz, DL continue to show results based on 
the log of arrests and they have added estimates based on an instrumental variable of dubious 
validity.   To those not immersed in such details, the exchange may appear to end in a “he said, 
she said” stalemate.   However, the hypothesis is so provocative and the policy implications so   38
profound that it is important to distill the exchange further.  Thus, it is useful to step back for a 
moment and ask whether there are features of an empirical test of abortion and crime that 
criminologists and economists might agree upon.  I would offer the following: 
1.  The crime measure must be age-specific in order to identify cohorts. 
2.  The outcome should be a rate of crime and not a level. 
3.  The hypothesis should be consistent with the timing of abortion legalization and should 
be evident or not contradicted by basic time-series plots. 
4.  The abortion rate should be measured by state of residence.  
5.  The abortion rate should be inversely related to fertility rates. 
6.  Regressions of age-state-year crime rates should include state-year fixed effects 
7.  The number of observations with no measure of abortion should be minimized. 
8.  Statistical tests should take account of the auto-correlation in crime-rate residuals. 
Many of these principles are achieved with Figures 4-7 and the regression results in Table 1.  
Taken together, they provide almost no support for the Donohue and Levitt hypothesis.  There is 
no evidence of a decline or moderation in homicide rates that is consistent with the timing of 
legalized abortion.  The abortion rate in Table 1 is measured by state of residence and 
incorporates DL’s suggested refinements in timing and migration. Specifications in columns (2) 
and (4) use age-specific arrests and homicide rates.   The regression estimates in Table 1 have 
been adjusted for state-year fixed effects, which provide a powerful control for period effects.  
The standard errors are adjusted for a general form of auto-correlation within each state.  The 
estimates in column (4) are based on a sub-sample of DL’s data for which information on 
abortion rates exist.  These estimates should be stronger than those in column (2), if the inclusion   39
of many cells with no abortion data attenuates the estimates.  If we focus only on the results in 
columns (2) and (4) then five of the eight coefficients have the wrong sign, none is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, and the magnitude of the coefficients is relatively small.  
IV.  International Evidence 
  Evidence on the abortion crime link from other countries provides another means by 
which to move the debate forward. Two published studies offer detailed attempts to replicate 
Donohue and Levitt’s work in Canada and the United Kingdom (Sen 2007; Kahane, Patton and 
Simmons 2007).   Pop-Eleches (2006) analyses the effect of Romania’s ban on abortion in 1967 
on the education and labor market outcomes of cohorts born immediately following the ban.  He 
also includes a limited analysis of the ban’s impact on crime (Pop-Eleches 2006).  Another 
“study” of abortion and crime in Australia is cited by Levitt and Dubner in Freakonomics.  But 
the article is little more than speculation as to a possible association that includes little data and 
no analysis (Leigh and Wolfers 1999).  Finally, Dills, Miron and Summers (2008) plot homicide 
rates 20 years after abortion was legalized in 11 countries.  Collectively, the international 
evidence provides little convincing support for an association between legalized abortion and 
crime.  
United Kingdom 
Kahane, Patton and Simmons (2007) analyze the abortion crime link in England and 
Wales.  Abortion was legalized in England, Scotland and Wales but not North Ireland in 1967 
and went into effect in April of 1968.   The number of abortions is assumed to be relatively 
complete since health authorities are required by law to report terminations.  Data on crime is 
from 42 police force areas in England and Wales from 1984-2004 and are available by single   40
year of age.
32  The authors first present a series of time-series plots of total crime rates and then 
separately for violent and property crime rates. There is no evidence of any decline in crime 
associated with legalized abortion.  In fact, rates of violent crime have risen steadily in England 
and Wales since 1984. The pattern for property crime and total crime differ significantly from 
violent crime.   Total crime and property rise from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s and then turn 
sharply downwards.  Unlike violent crime, total crime and property crime mimic the time-series 
pattern of US crime rates.  However, the timing of the downturn argues against and association 
in the UK since abortion became legal five years earlier in the UK than in the US (1967 vs. 
1973).    
  The regression results in Kahane, Patton and Simmons (2007) largely reflect the time-
series patterns.  The coefficient on the effective abortion rate in the violent crime regression is 
positive and statistically significant and thus, the exact opposite of the results obtained by DL in 
the US.  However, the coefficient on the effective abortion rate in the in the property crime and 
total crime regressions is negative and statistically significant.  But the negative association 
between total crime and the effective abortion rate does not stand up to robustness tests.   The 
association, for example, becomes positive if London is dropped from the sample.   
  As I have argued, regressions of total crime rates on the effective abortion rate offer a 
weak test because cohorts cannot be identified.  However, Kahane, Patton and Simmons (2007) 
also provide an age-specific analysis.  They regress rates of cautions and guilty verdicts on the 
abortion rate that existed the year before the cohort was born. The authors have over 8000 age-
area-year cells.  They include year-area and age-area fixed effects.  The coefficient on the 
                                                 
 
32 Crimes include total offenses officially recorded.  A second category of crime available by age is termed cautions 
plus guilty verdicts.  Cautions is a formal police warning as an alternative to court proceedings.  Cautions do not 
include informal warnings for shoplifting or traffic violations (Kahane, Patton and Simmons 2007).  
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abortion rate is positive in all seven regressions and statistically significant in two, the opposite 
of what DL would have expected.   Indeed, the estimates are more consist with Lott and 
Whitley’s (2007) hypothesis that legalized abortion increased crime than with Donohue and 
Levitt’s story of more wanted cohorts committing less crime.        
Canada 
  The relationship between abortion and crime in Canada is of particular interest given its 
proximity and culture similarity to the US.   In addition, Canada legalized abortion in 1969 and 
then expanded its availability again in 1988.  Third, Canada was not affected as much as the US 
by crack, gangs and guns, and thus, an important source of confounding in the US data is 
probably absent in Canada.  Sen (2007) has data on crime rates by year and province in Canada 
from 1983-1998 (n=144).  Data on abortion begin in 1970 and are stratified by age (teens and 
adults).   Thus, Sen can only replicate DL’s state-year regressions because he cannot measure the 
crime rates of specific cohorts.  Moreover, he has only nine provinces and thus limited 
geographic variation.  One potential advantage of Sen’s data is that the abortion rates are age-
specific.  In addition, Sen uses age-specific fertility rates as an alternative to abortion rates to 
measure variation in unwanted childbearing.  He finds that modifications of DL’s effective 
abortion rates are negatively associated with violent crime rates but not property crime rates in 
Canada.   The growth in the effective teen abortion rate or general abortion rate for all women 
can explain approximately 2.5 percent of the 10 percent decline in violent crime in Canada from 
1992 to 1998.  Sen re-estimates the same models but uses weighted lags in teen fertility rates or 
general fertility rates instead of the teen abortion or general abortion rate.   In these regressions 
only the lagged teen fertility rate is associated with an increase in violent crime and it can 
explain more than half the decline in violent crime in the 1990s.      42
  Sen provides two robustness checks.   First, he breaks total violent crime into its 
components: homicide, robbery, sexual assault and physical assault and re-estimates his models 
for each component separately.  The teen fertility rate is positively associated with only physical 
assault and none of the other three crime rates whereas the teen abortion rate is negatively 
associated with sexual and physical assault.  The lack of an association with homicide and all 
forms of property crime is inconsistent with DL.   The second check is a regression of teen 
fertility rates on indicators of abortion legalization.   The absence of an association between 
abortion legalization and teen fertility rates would undermine any association between abortion 
and crime.  Sen presents estimates from his regressions of teen fertility on abortion legalization 
from which he concludes, “These results suggest that both periods of abortion legalization 
experienced significant declines in teen fertility, with the 1970-88 period coefficient 
unsurprisingly smaller in magnitude than the corresponding 1989-1990 estimate” (Sen 2007, p. 
27). 
  Sen’s conclusion that the legalization of abortion is negatively correlated with teen 
fertility rates in Canada is a critical piece of evidence for it links his work to US studies that 
show a significant fall in fertility rates after the legalization of abortion (Sklar and Berkov 1974; 
Joyce and Mocan 1990; Levine et al. 1999; Angrist and Evans 1999).   Indeed, Donohue and 
Levitt repeatedly cite this US evidence to support their claim that legalized abortion improved 
the wantedness of cohorts.
33  However, the putative association between abortion legalization 
and teen fertility in Canada reported by Sen does not stand up to closer scrutiny.  Sen estimates 
the following two equations: 
                                                 
33 Donohue and Levitt (2004) never show that abortion rates are negatively associated with fertility rates beyond the 
period immediately following legalization in the US.  They fall back on the argument that abortion improves the 
timing of fertility, but they provide no evidence to support the claim.   
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(17)  jt j jt t jt e Marriage Leg TFR + + + + = − γ α α α 1 2 1 0  
(18)  jt j jt t jt e Marriage Spline Spline TFR + + + + + = − γ α β β α 1 2 2 1 0 2 1  
In equation (19), TFRjt is the teen fertility rate in province j (j=1,..9) and year t (t=1960,…1990).  
Legt is a dummy variable that represents the legalization of abortion nationally in Canada.  Early 
legalization occurred in 1969 and a later liberalization occurred in 1988.   However, Sen  
specifies Legt to be zero from 1960 to 1969, one in 1970 only, zero again from 1971 to 1988, one 
in 1989 only and zero again in 1990.   He includes no trend term in the model.  As specified, α1 
in equation (17) measures the level of teen fertility rates in 1970 and 1989 relative to teen 
fertility in 1960-1969, 1971-1988, and 1990.   The specification makes little sense since the 
reference category includes both the pre- and the post-legalization years.  Similarly the splines in 
equations (18) are simple linear trends terms and there is no legalization dummy.   Given the 
strong downward trend in teen fertility rates, they will undoubtedly be negative.   For instance, 
Figure 9 shows teen fertility rates by year and province in Canada.
34   
  
                                                 
34 I thank Professor Sen for sharing the fertility and abortion data. 
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Teen Fertility Rates by Canadian Province
 
In each province, teen fertility rates fall almost continuously between 1960 and 1990 except for 
an up tic in the early 1970s and late 1980s.  Ironically, the up tics occur just after abortion was 
legalized in 1969 and liberalized in 1988.  To explore this further I use the same data as Sen 
(2007) and regress teen fertility rates on two dummy variables for legalization.   The first 
indicator of legalization is one from 1970 to 1990 and zero in the years prior to 1970; the second 
indicator is one in 1989 and 1990 and zero in all other years.  I also included a linear trend term, 
the lagged marriage rate, and province fixed effects.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the province level.  Thus, I duplicate Sen’s regression but with more conventional indicators 
for legalization and a linear trend to control for secular movements in fertility.   If legalization 
lowers teen fertility rates there should be a discontinuity at 1970 and then in 1988.  The 
estimated equation and standard errors for the key variables are shown below.   45
 (19) 
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The coefficients on both legalization dummies are positive and statistically significant.  The 
trend term is negative and also statistically significant.   These estimates suggest that the 
legalization of abortion increased teen fertility in Canada, a result more consistent with Akerlof 
et al. (1996).   The exercise is limited because legalization was national and identification comes 
from within-province deviations from a national trend.  Nevertheless, the coefficient on abortion 
legalization in equation (19) is the exact opposite of Sen’s and contrary to his claim that 
legalized abortion lowered the rate of unwanted childbearing among teens.   
The Sen article figures prominently in the debate, since Levitt and Dubner cite an earlier 
version of the manuscript in Freakonomics as evidence that abortion lowered crime in other 
countries.  But Sen’s analysis is actually a step backwards in the debate.  There is no association 
between abortion legalization and teen fertility, a seemingly necessary condition for an 
association between abortion and crime.
35  There are only nine provinces in Canada and thus the 
analysis is even more vulnerable than DL’s state-year regressions to uncontrolled state-year 
effects.  The results for violent crime are only robust for sexual assault, an outcome less 
consistently measured than murder.   Finally and most damaging, the study includes no analysis 
of age-specific crime rates.  Consequently, Sen is unable to associate the crime rates of cohorts 
and the abortion rate that existed the year before their birth—a basic test of cohort effects.    
                                                 
35 Even if legalized abortion affected only the timing of births among teens, there still should be a negative 
association between legalized abortion and teen fertility rates.  This would not necessarily be the case for 20-24 year 
olds, since teens who delay childbearing until their early 20s could offset the decrease in births among young adults.  
But since teens are the youngest group of mothers, a fall in fertility or an increase in delay fertility should be 
negatively associated with legalized abortion.    46
Romania 
The third prominent study with data on abortion and crime exploits one the most dramatic 
changes in fertility ever recorded (Pop-Eleches 2006).  In 1967, the Romanian dictator, Nicolas 
Ceausescu, banned all abortion in the country.  Birth rates doubled that same year, since abortion 
had been the most common form of fertility control.  Outcomes among children born 
immediately after the ban improved.  Educational achievement increased and employment in 
high-skilled jobs rose among the cohort exposed to the ban.  The unexpected result occurs 
because the ban increased the proportion of births to more educated urban households.  
Conditional on the parents’ socioeconomic status, the ban on birth causes outcomes to worsen 
consistent with a decrease in “wantedness.”  The probability of finishing high school, for 
example, fell 1.7 percentage points relative to a mean of 52.1 percent and the probability of 
employment in a high-skilled job fell 0.7 percentage points, a decline of over 7 percent.  
  Motivated by the DL study in the US, Pop-Eleches compares the crime rates of cohorts 
born before and after the ban.  However, unlike in the analysis of schooling and labor market 
outcomes, he was unable to control for the composition of births given limitations in the data.  
Accordingly, he finds that the crime rate of cohorts born in the first few years after the ban falls, 
the opposite of the DL hypothesis.  As a crude adjustment for the composition of births, Pop-
Eleches compared crime rates of cohorts born in 1970 to those born prior to the 1967 ban.  He 
finds that the ban is associated with an increase in crime, a finding more consistent with DL’s 
hypothesis.  Pop-Eleches (2006), however, acknowledges the tenuousness of his findings with 
respect to crime.  The treatment group consists of cohorts born more than three years after the 
ban.  The strategy undermines the quasi-experimental design since the estimates based on 
cohorts so long after the ban are more vulnerable to confounding from period effects.  Pop-  47
Eleches writes, “However, the present framework cannot control for other time-specific factors 
that might also have affected the criminal behavior of cohorts born after 1970.  As an example, 
these results could also be explained by the increased criminal behavior of young people during 
the transition process” (Pop-Eleches 2006, p. 769).  In an effort to control for period effects, Pop-
Eleches includes age-specific trends terms.   In these specifications the association between 
abortion and crime is weaker and no longer statistically significant.  
Australia and other countries  
A review of the association between abortion and crime in other countries would not 
normally include Australia.  However, Levitt and co-author Dubner contend that, “studies of 
Australia and Canada have since established a similar link between legalized abortion and crime” 
(Levitt and Dubner, 2005, p.141).  The Canadian study is by Sen and discussed above.   There is, 
however, no Australian study. Levitt and Dubner are referring to a three-page overview of 
whether the association between abortion and crime might be relevant to Australia. The authors 
of the Australian article provide no analysis, only speculation from a few stylized facts.  They 
write, “Unlike Donohue and Levitt, we lack two sets of statistics.  We have been unable to access 
any figures for the numbers of abortions performed during the 1970s and 1980s. Nor have we 
been able to obtain a full breakdown of homicide in Australia by age of perpetrator.  If this data 
does exist, it would shed considerable light on whether there is a link between abortion and 
crime in Australia (Leigh and Wolfers 2000, p. 30).
36  Finally, in a review of the economics of 
crime, Dills, Miron and Summers (2008) include a graphical presentation of abortion legalization 
                                                 
36 The mention of Australia as corroborating evidence might be forgiven as popular writing, but as DiNardo (2006) 
argues, it is characteristic of Levitt’s rhetoric in Freakonomics.  “…one disappointing aspect of Freakonomics was 
its discussion about research conducted by others.  It would appear that the goal of characterizing other research 
accurately conflicted with other goals” (DiNardo 2006, p. 618).  
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and homicide rates in 20 countries.   They look at homicide rates 20 years after abortion became 
legal.  In the 11 countries with sufficient years of data since legalization they find “…little 
support for the hypothesis that legalizing abortion reduces crime” (p. 15).  
Other evidence 
  To this point I have focused on specific critiques of DL or studies cited by DL that 
directly support their hypothesis.  Other studies have controlled for abortion in analyses of crime 
or have published work in journals not commonly read by economists and criminologists.  For 
example, Reyes (2007) argues that reduction in childhood lead exposure in the 1970s led to 
lower crime rates in the 1990s.   Her research design is similar to DL’s state-year regressions.  
Total crime rates are regressed on lagged measures of lead exposure at the state level.  Reyes 
includes the effective abortion rate as an additional regressor. Her results suggest that lead can 
explain 56 percent and abortion 29 percent of the decline in violent crime between 1992 and 
2002.   In other words, 85 percent of the recent drop in crime can be attributable to factors never 
considered by criminologists.   These are huge effects which immediately raises skepticism.  But 
more substantively, Reyes’s identification strategy builds on the weakest aspects of DL’s design.   
Without age-specific crime rates, there is no way to credibly test for cohort effects.   Moreover, 
Reyes claims to have uncovered dramatic cohort effects during years characterized by 
unprecedented period effects that were specific to a particular age, race and geographical 
segments of the population.  As I have argued above, distinguishing period from cohort effects 
cannot be accomplished convincingly without linking the intervention (or exposure) to specific 
cohorts 
As noted previously, a recent study updated the work of Gruber, Levine and Stagier 
(1999) analysis of the “marginal child.”  Ananat et al. (2009) use the 2000 census to analyze the   49
longer-term association between abortion legalization and the “marginal child” (Ananat et al. 
2009).  In this paper the authors refer, but never show, regressions that attempt to replicate the 
work of DL (2001).   They write, “ …we estimate IV models where changes in the birth ratio and 
birth rate are instrumented using changes in abortion policy.  With this approach we found a 
negative but not precisely estimated effect of reduced abortion costs on crime per 
capita….Therefore, our results align with the previous literature in that reduced abortion costs 
led to reduced crime, but largely through a reduction in cohort size (total crime) rather than 
through selection (crime per capita)” [Ananat et al. 2009, p. 135].  The authors refer readers to 
estimates from a National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper (Ananat et al. 2006).  
However, an examination of the actual regression results reveals conflicting findings and 
puzzling estimates. As the authors state, the association between the natural logarithm of arrests 
for violent and property crime and the marginal birth rate are positive, suggesting that marginal 
children would have committed more crimes had they been born.   But as I have argued 
previously, regressions of total crimes or arrests on the birth rate make little sense since they are 
mechanically related. An increase in the birth rate will lead to an increase in the population 
which leads to an increase in the number of crimes.   The results are also puzzling in that the 
coefficients and standard errors obtained by ordinary least squares (OLS) are essentially the 
same as those estimated by two-stage least squares (TSLS).   For instance, the coefficient on the 
birth rate in a regression of total violent crime arrests is 0.387 (0.112) when estimated by OLS 
and 0.310 (0.127) when estimated by TSLS (standard errors are in parentheses).   The same 
occurs with total arrests for property crime: 0.249 (0.094) by OLS and 0.306 (0.099) by TSLS 
(see Table 6 in Ananat et al. 2006).   It is extremely unlikely that the standard errors on the TSLS 
estimates would be same as those estimated by OLS.  The other revealing finding is that   50
regressions of arrests per capita, a more appropriate outcome, on the natural logarithm of the 
birth rate are negatively related to arrest rates in both the OLS and IV regressions, a finding that 
contradicts DL.  None of these are precisely estimated but neither do they support Ananat et al.’s 
(2009) statement of a direct association between crime per capita and the cost of abortion.  
     Another study uses an interrupted time-series analysis to test for the effect of Roe v. 
Wade on national number of homicide victim by are (15 to 24 year olds), race and sex (Berk, 
Sorenson, Wiebe and Upchurch 2003).   The authors find that national legalization was 
associated with a gradual decline in homicide victims after 1988.   The authors do not uncover 
any discontinuity in the time-series.  Instead they report a change in slope associated with lagged 
exposure to legalized abortion.  The results are not convincing.  As shown in Figure 5, homicide 
rates for 15 to 20 years olds peak in roughly the same year, a pattern inconsistent with a cohort 
effect.  Moreover, their reliance on various lags that tend to increase with age is ad hoc and 
vulnerable to confounding from unobserved period effects.   The authors downplay the 
importance of crack markets arguing that that drug violence affected primarily blacks.   But the 
white homicide rates in the SHR include Hispanics, many of whom were exposed to drug 
markets in major cities such as New York, Los Angeles and Chicago.  Foote and Goetz (2008) 
also analyze national time series of arrest rates of 15 to 24 year olds by single year of age.   They 
find no association with state abortion rates. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  Donohue and Levitt (2001) end their seminal piece with a remarkable prediction.  Using 
1997 as the point of reference they write,    51
Roughly half of the crimes committed in the United States are done by criminals 
born prior to the legalization of abortion.  As these older cohorts age out of criminality 
and are replaced by younger offenders born after abortion became legal, we predict that 
crime rates will continue to fall.  When a steady state is reached roughly twenty years 
from now, the impact of abortion will be roughly twice as great as the impact felt so far 
(p. 415)  
We now have 10 years of data on homicide rates since 1997 with which to offer a preliminary 
assessment of their prediction.  If DL are correct, then we would expect the decline in crime that 
had been realized up to 1997 to essentially double over the next twenty years.  Figure 9 shows 
the homicide rate in the US and New York City from 1980 to 2006.  Nineteen ninety-seven is 
marked by the vertical line.  I include New York City because not only did New York legalize 
abortion prior to Roe, but the city’s abortion rate is approximately triple the national rate.  In 
addition, the city has experienced the largest decline in homicide since 1990 of any major city in 
the US.   The time-series data in Figure 9 are not consistent with a major cohort effect that 
inexorably pushed crime down as more and more cohorts were exposed.  The data instead    52









































suggest some shock that caused early cohorts to experience rapidly rising homicide rates after 
1985, followed by a dramatic reversal though much of the 1990s, ending with little change 
among the most recent cohorts.  The leveling off after 2000 is clearly at odds with their 
prediction 
The times series data in Figure 9 are too crude for conclusions. However, they underscore 
a point I have emphasize throughout this review.  Donohue and Levitt’s presentation of the 
evidence relied too much on highly-aggregated regressions, run over limited time periods, with 
questionable specifications and no acknowledgement of the endogeneity of abortion.  If they had 
started with simple time-series of age-specific arrest and homicide rates pre and post the points 
of abortion legalization, they would have been confronted with the lack of discontinuities 
consistent with large cohort effects.  Their responses to Joyce (2004) and Foote and Goetz (2008) 
were akin to doubling down on their regression bets.  
Despite the remarkable public dissemination of the findings, the policy implications of 
their results have been largely ignored.  If taken seriously, their findings imply that all forms of 
fertility control will reap major gains in well-being, reduced crime being only one.  It would 
seem that both pro- and anti-abortion advocates could coalesce around the call for better family 
planning and fewer unwanted pregnancies.   Instead, their results devolved into another battle to 
be waged in the politics of abortion.  Few extended the implications for crime for other 
outcomes.  Criminologists, according to DL, appeared to have missed the big story behind the 
great crime decline.   But the straightforward approach to the evidence served this community of 
social scientists well.   Criminologists have long debated the effect of cohort size on crime rates.     54
The notion that abortion may have selection effects beyond cohort size was a new wrinkle that at 
first peaked interest, but was eventually dismissed after an early examination of age-specific 
crime rates.   
In the end, DL’s story remains a best seller.  It is bold, provocative, accessible and 
beautifully argued.   Academics and graduate students will continue to explore the association 
between abortion and crime and its many offshoots for years to come.    55
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